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Abstract	  
We	   estimate	   that	   a	   hard	   Brexit	   would	   reduce	   UK	   imports	   of	   agro	   industrial	  
products	   from	   the	  EU	  by	  50%	   i.e.by	  more	   than	  double	   the	   contraction	   in	   imports	  of	  
other	  goods	  (22%).	  The	  UK	  Government	  has	  announced	  that	  it	  will	  substitute	  the	  CAP	  
(Common	   Agricultural	   Policy)	   protectionist	   policies	   with	   market-­‐oriented	   measures	  
and	   policies	   that	   seek	   to	   protect	   the	   environment.	   Given	   Brexit,	   and	   given	   scarce	  
negotiating	   resources,	   should	   Mercosur	   continue	   to	   give	   the	   same	   priority	   to	  
negotiations	  with	  the	  EU	  as	  in	  recent	  years?	  The	  answer	  is	  most	  likely	  negative.	  For	  a	  
number	  of	  reasons	  discussed	  in	  the	  text	  we	  argue	  that:	  i)	  negotiations	  with	  the	  EU	  are	  
unlikely	  to	  deliver	  market	  access	  much	  in	  excess	  of	  what	  it	  has	  offered	  so	  far;	  ii)	  unlike	  
these	  negotiations	   that	  have	  been	  dragging	   for	  around	   twenty	  years,	   there	  are	  clear	  
circumstances	   indicating	   that	   an	   FTA	  with	   the	  UK	   could	  be	   completed	   in	   a	   relatively	  
short	  period;	  iii)	  failing	  Mercosur	  to	  give	  these	  talks	  priority,	  other	  countries	  are	  more	  
than	  likely	  to	  fill	  the	  UK	  trade	  gap	  triggered	  by	  Brexit;	  iv)	  if	  other	  countries	  do	  so,	  it	  is	  
unlikely	  that	  in	  the	  future	  the	  UK	  would	  be	  willing	  to	  offer	  market	  access	  concessions	  
as	   important	   as	   it	   is	   likely	   to	   do	   today	   and,	   v)	   the	  UK	   is	   one	   fifth	   of	   the	   EU	  GDP	   so	  
balanced	   reciprocal	   concessions	   should	  be	  easier	   to	  achieve.	  What	  are	   the	   stakes	  at	  
play?	  We	  offer	  back	  of	  the	  envelope	  estimates	  indicating	  that	  in	  value	  terms	  Mercosur	  
could	  more	  than	  triple	  its	  meat	  exports	  and	  close	  to	  double	  its	  agro	  industrial	  exports	  
to	  the	  UK	  within	  a	  time	  horizon	  that	  currently	  appears	  to	  be	  quite	  concrete	  and	  near.	  	  
I.	  Introduction	  
	   The	  outcome	  of	  the	  Brexit	  negotiations	  between	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  (UK)	  and	  
the	  European	  Union	  (EU)	  is	  still	  anyone’s	  guess	  but	  under	  any	  agreement,	  trade	  flows	  
between	   these	   partners	   will	   decline	   and	   this	   in	   turn	   will	   create	   opportunities	   and	  
challenges	  for	  third	  countries2.	  The	  UK	  is	  the	  second	  largest	  economy	  in	  the	  EU	  with	  a	  
GDP	  equivalent	  to	  around	  20%	  of	  the	  other	  EU	  members’3.	  Therefore,	  not	  surprisingly,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	   I	   am	   grateful	   to	   Jose	   L.	  Machinea,	   Alan	  Mathews,	   and	   L.	   Alan	  Winters	   for	   insightful	   comments	   and	  
suggestions	  to	  a	  preliminary	  draft.	  Manuel	  Aispuro	  worked	  efficiently	   in	  the	  preparation	  of	  tables	  and	  
graphs.	  I	  also	  appreciate	  partial	  financing	  from	  Argentina’s	  Ministry	  of	  Production.	  Any	  remaining	  errors	  
are	  my	  sole	  responsibility.	  
Member	  National	  Academy	  of	  Economic	  Sciences	  (http://www.anceargentina.org).	  
Email:	  Noguésjuliojorge@gmail.com	  
2	   These	   trade	   effects	   trigger	   macroeconomic	   consequences	   which	   among	   several	   others,	   have	   been	  
studied	  by	  HM	  Treasury	   (2016	  and	  2016a),	  and	  by	  Minford	  and	  Miller	   (2016).	  While	   the	  study	  by	  HM	  
Treasury	   assumes	   a	   highly	   protectionist	   Brexit,	   Minford	   and	   Miller	   (who	   represent	   the	   group	   of	  
“Economists	   for	   Brexit”),	   assume	   that	   post	   Brexit	   the	   UK	   adopts	   free	   trade	   policies	   and	   this	   in	   turn	  
would	   increase	   GDP.	   For	   critical	   views	   on	   these	   studies’	   assumptions	   and	   results	   see	   Gudgin	   et.	   al.	  
(2017)	  on	  the	  Treasury	  report,	  and	  Sampson	  et.	  al.	  (2016)	  and	  Winters	  (2017)	  on	  Minford’s	  analysis.	  
3	  UK’s	  GDP	  is	  close	  to	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  thirteen	  countries	  that	   joined	  the	  EU	  in	  this	  millennium	  plus	  the	  
three	  that	  joined	  in	  1995.	  In	  this	  sense,	  Brexit	  takes	  the	  EU	  back	  to	  where	  it	  was	  some	  25	  years	  ago.	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for	  some	  of	  the	  products	  that	  the	  UK	  trades,	  Brexit	  will	  have	  quite	  large	  effects	  and	  in	  
particular,	  this	  is	  the	  case	  of	  agro	  industrial	  products	  which	  we	  study	  here.	  
The	  bilateral	  trade	  policy	  that	  will	  eventually	  be	  agreed	  upon	  will	  fall	  within	  two	  
extreme	  outcomes:	  i)	  a	  hard	  Brexit	  (HB)	  where	  both	  partners	  initially	  adopt	  MFN	  tariffs	  
and,	   ii)	   a	  most	   liberal	   free	   trade	   agreement	   (FTA).	   Both	  extremes	   are	  unlikely.	  A	  HB	  
would	  shatter	   trade	   flows	   to	  an	  extent	   that	   important	  pressure	  groups	  are	  opposing	  
with	   strength	   in	   both	   the	  UK	   and	   the	   EU.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   a	   very	   open	   bilateral	  
trade	   policy	   like	   that	   between	   the	   EU	   and	   EFTA	   (European	   Free	   Trade	   Association)	  
countries,	   and	   the	   EU	   and	   EEA	   (European	   Economic	   Area)	  members	   implies	   that	   in	  
exchange	  for	  accessing	  the	  common	  market	  they	  have	  to	  maintain	  open	  borders	  to	  the	  
movement	   of	   persons,	   and	   they	   also	   have	   to	   contribute	   financially	   to	   the	   social	  
objectives	  of	   the	  EU.	  Because	  both	  of	   these	  policies	  are	   included	  among	   the	  UK	   red	  
lines4,	   the	   odds	   are	   also	   against	   a	   very	   liberal	   bilateral	   trade	   policy	   (Gasoriek	   et.	   al.	  
2016)5.	  
Clearly	  a	  HB	  is	  the	  worst	  case	  scenario	  and	  estimating	  its	  trade	  effects	  is	  likely	  
to	  overstate	  the	  opportunities	  and	  challenges	  that	  third	  countries	  will	  face.	  Still,	  until	  a	  
clearer	  picture	  emerges	   from	  the	  bilateral	  negotiations	  on	   trade,	   in	   the	  case	  of	  agro	  
industrial	  products	  the	  exercise	  remains	  useful	  for	  at	  least	  three	  reasons:	  i)	  in	  contrast	  
to	  the	  abundant	  number	  of	  papers	  that	  have	  quantified	  the	  aggregate	  trade	  effects	  of	  
a	   HB	   including	   the	   study	   by	   HM	   Treasury	   (2016)	   and	   Gudgin	   et.	   al	   (2017),	   there	  
appears	  to	  be	  little	  work	  focused	  on	  measuring	  the	  impact	  on	  agro	  industrial	  trade6,	  ii)	  
in	  most	  of	  the	  FTAs	  signed	  by	  the	  EU,	  the	  agro	  industrial	  chapter	  is	  either	  non-­‐existent	  
or	  highly	  restrictive	  of	  temperate	  agricultural	  products7	  and,	  iii)	  these	  products	  are	  of	  
particular	  export	  importance	  for	  the	  Mercosur	  countries	  which	  we	  focus	  on8.	  	  
Unlike	  most	  trade	  negotiations	  Brexit	  has	  concrete	  deadlines:	  March	  29,	  2019	  
for	  leaving	  the	  EU,	  and	  December	  31,	  2020	  for	  concluding	  the	  transition	  period.	  After	  
that,	  it	  will	  be	  the	  first	  time	  since	  1973	  when	  the	  UK	  joined	  the	  EU,	  that	  third	  countries	  
will	   face	   close	   to	   a	   level	   playing	   vis	   a	   vis	   the	   EU	   as	   competing	   suppliers	   of	   agro	  
industrial	  products	  to	  one	  of	  its	  former	  and	  major	  members.	  	  
How	  important	  is	  the	  UK	  agro	  industrial	  market?	  In	  2016	  the	  UK	  imported	  USD	  
43,480	  million	  of	  agro	  industrial	  products	  from	  the	  EU	  and	  we	  estimate	  that	  a	  HB	  will	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  The	  other	  two	  UK	  red	  lines	  include	  regaining	  the	  freedom	  to	  decide	  its	  own	  trade	  policy,	  and	  becoming	  
independent	  of	  rulings	  from	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  (Gasoriek	  et.	  al.	  2016).	  
5	  More	   to	   the	  point,	   in	  December	  2017	  Michael	  Barnier	   the	  EU	  chief	   trade	  negotiator	   concluded	   that	  
given	  the	  EU	  red	  lines,	  “…the	  Canada	  model	  was	  the	  only	  model	  which	  the	  EU	  could	  offer	  to	  the	  UK…”	  
(Mathews	  2018,	  p	  5).	  Among	  the	  FTAs	  that	  the	  EU	  is	  implementing,	  the	  one	  with	  Canada	  is	  quite	  liberal	  
but	   not	   as	   much	   as	   those	   that	   characterize	   its	   arrangements	   with	   members	   of	   the	   EEA	   and	   EFTA	  
countries.	  
6	  Exceptions	  include	  Mathews	  (2018),	  Bellora	  et.	  al	  (2017),	  and	  Yu	  et.	  al	  (2017).	  
7	  When	  assessing	  Mercosur	  export	  prospects	  from	  Brexit	  we	  make	  room	  for	  the	  event	  of	  a	  UK-­‐EU	  FTA.	  	  
8	  In	  quantifying	  the	  aggregate	  trade	  effects	  of	  a	  HB	  most	  studies	  have	  relied	  on	  gravity	  equations	  such	  as	  
HM	  Treasury	  (2016	  and	  2016a).	  This	  econometric	  methodology	  requires	  thousands	  of	  observations	  over	  
time	  and	  space	  and	  its	  results	  are	  not	  necessarily	  more	  precise	  than	  simpler	  approaches	  as	  the	  one	  we	  
rely	  on	  in	  section	  III.	  General	  equilibrium	  models	  have	  been	  a	  third	  way	  of	  quantifying	  the	  likely	  impact	  
of	  Brexit	  (for	  example	  Bellora	  et.	  al	  2017).	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reduce	  this	  trade	  by	  around	  50%9.This	  sizable	  contraction	  is	  the	  result	  of	  moving	  from	  
the	  existing	  scenario	  of	  close	  to	  free	   intra	  EU	  trade	  to	  the	  very	  high	  MFN	  tariffs	   that	  
prevail	   under	   the	   CAP.	   The	   UK	   has	   been	   quite	   explicit	   that	   post	   Brexit	   it	   will	   open	  
imports	   to	   international	   competition	   either	   by	   implementing	   unilateral	   liberalization	  
measures	  but	  probably	  more	  enthusiastically,	  by	   signing	  FTAs	  with	   selected	  partners	  
(Department	  of	  Environment	  2018).	  
Faced	  with	  the	  reality	  of	  Brexit,	  third	  country	  exporters	  like	  Mercosur	  will	  have	  
to	  decide	  the	  priority	  to	  be	  given	  to	  negotiating	  an	  FTA	  with	  the	  UK10.	  We	  call	  attention	  
to	  the	  importance	  of	  this	  opportunity	  over	  other	  negotiations	  such	  as	  the	  Mercosur-­‐EU	  
discussions	   that	   have	   been	   evolving	   for	   nearly	   two	   decades	   and	   still	   with	   no	  
agreement	   in	   near	   sight.	   Regarding	   these	   trade	   talks,	   Cecilia	   Malmstrom	   the	   EU	  
Commissioner	  for	  Trade,	  has	  stated	  that:	  “We	  are	  particularly	  careful	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  
negotiations	  with	  partners	  who	  are	  strong	  exporters	  of	  our	  sensitive	  products.	  That's	  
how	  we	  are	  approaching	  the	  Mercosur	  negotiations	  and	  the	  question	  of	  beef	  exports	  
in	  particular.	  These	  countries	  are	  highly	  valuable	  trading	  partners	  for	  the	  EU,	  including,	  
as	  I've	  mentioned,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  many	  agricultural	  products.	  But	   let	  me	  be	  clear,	  
we	  will	   not	  make	   any	   commitments	   that	   go	   further	   than	  what	   sensitive	   sectors	   can	  
handle”	   (Malmstrom	  2016).In	   fact,	   since	   the	   early	  millennium	  years	  when	   the	   initial	  
exchange	   of	   market	   access	   offers	   took	   place,	   the	   EU	   has	   remained	   increasingly	  
defensive	   particularly	   in	   template	   agricultural	   products.	   Below	   we	   offer	   some	  
explanations	  of	  why	  this	  has	  been	  the	  case.	   
	   The	  remaining	  discussion	  is	  organized	  as	  follows.	  Section	  II	  presents	  a	  picture	  of	  
the	  structure	  of	  UK	  agro	  industrial	  trade	  with	  the	  EU	  and	  with	  Mercosur	  while	  Section	  
III	  offers	  estimates	  of	   the	  quantitative	   impact	  of	  a	  HB	  on	   the	  UK	   import	  demand	   for	  
agro-­‐industrial	  products	  in	  general,	  and	  few	  selected	  products	  in	  particular.	  Section	  IV	  
calls	   attention	   to	   some	   structural	   economic	   factors	   that	   point	   towards	   a	   decreasing	  
likelihood	  of	  the	  EU	  improving	  its	  market	  access	  offer	  to	  Mercosur	  in	  order	  to	  reach	  an	  
agreement.	   Section	   V	   begins	   by	   discussing	   some	   non-­‐economic	   considerations	  
regarding	  a	  possible	  Mercosur-­‐UK	  FTA.	  Also	  as	  an	  example,	  the	  discussion	  here	  offers	  
estimates	  on	  Mercosur’s	  meat	  and	  agro	  industrial	  products	  in	  general	  that	  a	  HB	  would	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9We	  identify	  agro	  industrial	  products	  as	  those	  contained	  in	  the	  first	  twenty-­‐four	  chapters	  of	  the	  
Harmonized	  System	  (HS).	  
10In	   emphasizing	   the	   importance	  of	   a	  Mercosur-­‐UK	   FTA,	   delicate	  political	   and	   geo-­‐political	   issues	  will	  
have	  to	  be	  overcome.	  Because	  I	  am	  not	  an	  expert	  on	  these	  themes,	  I	  will	  not	  deal	  with	  them	  here,	  but	  
will	  only	  point	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   there	  currently	  appears	   to	  be	  constructive	  spirits	  on	  all	  parts.	   I	   remind	  
that	  recently	  on	  May	  23,	  2018	  when	  honouring	  Argentina’s	  soldiers	  that	  died	  in	  the	  Malvinas	  war,	  Boris	  
Johnson	   UK’s	   Chancellor	   said:	   “I	   wish	   this	   will	   be	   a	   new	   chapter	   in	   our	   relationship	   and	   a	   signal	   for	  
strengthening	   trade	   ties	   after	   the	  UK	   leaves	   the	   EU”	   (author’s	   translation	   from	  a	  note	   entitled	   :	   “Por	  
primera	  vez	  un	  Cancliller	  Británico	  homenajeó	  en	  la	  Argentina	  a	  los	  caídos	  en	  las	  Malvinas”	  published	  in	  
Ámbito	   Financiero	   (2018):http://www.ambito.com/921833-­‐por-­‐primera-­‐vez-­‐un-­‐canciller-­‐britanico-­‐
homenajeo-­‐en-­‐la-­‐argentina-­‐a-­‐los-­‐caidos-­‐en-­‐malvinas	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II.	  UK	  agro	  industrial	  trade	  with	  the	  EU	  and	  Mercosur	  
	   The	  EU	  is	  by	  far	  the	  major	  trade	  partner	  of	  the	  UK	  but	  because	  of	   its	  growing	  
deficit	  in	  goods,	  over	  time	  the	  relative	  importance	  of	  this	  market	  has	  shifted11.	  Table	  1	  
shows	  that	  while	  in	  2001	  the	  EU	  accounted	  for	  59%	  of	  aggregate	  UK	  exports,	  by	  2016	  
this	  number	  had	  declined	  to	  47%.	  On	  the	  import	  side	  the	  opposite	  occurred:	   in	  2001	  
UK	  imports	  from	  this	  source	  accounted	  for	  50%	  of	  the	  total	  but	  by	  2016,	  this	  number	  
had	  increased	  to	  52%	  (table	  2).	  During	  this	  period,	  the	  UK’s	  aggregate	  trade	  with	  the	  
Mercosur	  countries	  was	  relatively	  negligible:	  0.7%-­‐0.8%.	  
	  
Table	  1:	  UK	  aggregate	  and	  agro	  industrial	  exports	  to	  the	  EU,	  to	  the	  world	  and	  to	  




Exports	  to	  the	  EU	   Exports	  to	  the	  world	   EU	  share	  (%)	  
Exports	  to	  the	  
Mercosur	   Mercosur’s	  share	  
2001	   2016	   2001	   2016	   2001	   2016	   2001	   2016	   2001	   2016	  
Agro	  
industrial	   8,843	   17,503	   14,520	   28,884	   60.9%	   60.6%	   312	   232	   2.2%	   0.8%	  




5.3%	   9.0%	   5.2%	   7.0%	   na	   na	   14.8%	   7.0%	   na	   Na	  
na:	  not	  applicable.	  
Source:	  Data	  from	  Trademap.	  
	  
Table	  2:	  UK	  aggregate	  and	  agro	  industrial	  imports	  from	  the	  EU,	  from	  the	  world	  and	  
from	  Mercosur	  (million	  USD)	  
HS	  
chapter	  





2001	   2016	   2001	   2016	   2001	   2016	   2001	   2016	   2001	   2016	  
Agro	  
industrial	   18,651	   43,480	   30,431	   61,311	   61.3%	   70.9%	   1,220	   2,042	   4.0%	   3.3%	  




10.3%	   13.2%	   8.5%	   9.6%	   na	   na	   42.1%	   46.1%	   na	   Na	  
na:	  not	  applicable	  
Source:	  Data	  from	  Trademap.	  
Graph	  1	  shows	  the	  growing	  deficit	  of	  the	  UK	  in	  its	  agro	  industrial	  trade	  with	  the	  
EU.	  As	  seen,	  this	  deficit	  has	  been	  driven	  mainly	  by	  a	  relatively	  fast	  import	  growth	  that	  
peaked	   in	   2014	   with	   nearly	   USD	   50,000	  million.	   Although	   since	   then	   these	   imports	  
have	   declined	   to	   around	   USD	   43,400	   million	   in	   2016,	   by	   historical	   standards	   they	  
remain	  at	  a	  relatively	  high	  level.	  This	  has	  obvious	  implications	  on	  the	  relevance	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	   This	  deficit	  has	  been	  counterbalanced	  by	  a	  growing	   surplus	   in	   services	   trade:	   in	  2016	  UK’s	   services	  
exports	  and	  imports	  were	  USD	  327,176	  million	  and	  USD	  198,653	  million	  respectively.	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impact	  of	  Brexit	  on	  UK	  trade	  in	  these	  products	  and	  on	  the	  export	  opportunities	  that	  it	  
would	  offer	  to	  third	  countries.	  
The	   UK	   dependence	   on	   the	   EU	   as	   a	   source	   of	   supply	   of	   these	   products	   has	  
increased	   by	   ten	   percentage	   points	   from	   61%	   in	   2001	   to	   71%	   in	   2016	   when	   total	  
imports	  of	  agro	   industrial	  products	   totalled	  USD	  61,311	  million	   (table	  2).	   In	  contrast,	  
the	  share	  of	   the	  EU	   in	  aggregate	  UK	  exports	  barely	   increased	   from	  50.4%	   in	  2001	  to	  
52%	  in	  2016	  suggesting	  that	  under	  prevailing	  protectionist	  policies,	   in	  these	  products	  
the	  UK	  has	   a	   relative	   but	   artificial	   competitive	   disadvantage.	   This	   and	   related	   issues	  
discussed	  below	  have	  led	  several	  observers	  as	  well	  as	  the	  UK	  government	  to	  call	   into	  
question	  the	  so	  called	  benefits	  of	  the	  CAP	  to	  the	  development	  of	  its	  agricultural	  sector.	  
Graph	  1:	  Exports,	  imports	  and	  trade	  balance	  of	  UK	  agro	  industrial	  trade	  with	  the	  EU	  







2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Exports Imports Trade	  balance
	  
Source:	  Data	  from	  Trademap.	  
During	   this	   period,	   the	   UK	   import	   share	   of	   agro	   industrial	   products	   from	  
Mercosur	   declined	   from	   4%	   to	   3.3%	   (table	   2)	   which	   contrast	   with	   Mercosur’s	  
participation	   in	  world	   agro	   industrial	   exports	   growing	   from	  6.6%	   in	  2001,	   to	  8.1%	   in	  
2016.	  These	  low	  trade	  shares	  in	  the	  EU	  are	  partly	  the	  consequence	  of	  trade	  diversion	  
effects12.	  
	   Table	  3	  shows	  UK’s	  imports	  from	  the	  EU	  and	  from	  Mercosur	  for	  the	  five	  most	  
important	   agro	   industrial	   chapters	   of	   the	   HS	   imported	   by	   the	   UK.	   In	   2016	   these	  
imports	   from	  the	  EU	   totalled	  USD	  20,568	  million	  equivalent	   to	  85%	  of	   the	   total	   that	  
the	  UK	  imported	  this	  year	  (USD	  24,196	  million).	  In	  contrast,	  the	  share	  of	  imports	  from	  
the	   Mercosur	   accounted	   for	   only	   1.3%.	   The	   last	   column	   in	   this	   table	   shows	   that	  
Mercosur’s	  share	  in	  UK’s	  import	  are	  well	  below	  its	  share	  in	  world	  exports.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	   In	  some	  cases,	  the	  share	  of	  the	  EU	  in	  UK	  agro	  industrial	  has	  grown	  very	  fast.	  For	  example,	  between	  
2001	  and	  2015	  the	  share	  of	   imports	  coming	   from	  the	  EU	  grew	  as	   follows:	   frozen	  boneless	  meat	   from	  
40%	  to	  80%;	  chicken	  meat	   from	  78%	  to	  90%;	  and	  wine	   from	  40%	  to	  70%.	  Nogués	   (2017)	   reviews	   the	  
trade	  diversion	  effects	  triggered	  by	  the	  EU	  on	  Mercosur	  and	  vice	  versa.	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Table	  3:	  UK	  imports	  from	  the	  EU	  and	  from	  Mercosur	  for	  five	  selected	  HS	  chapters:	  
2016	  (USD	  million)	  
HS	  


















exports	  EU	   Mercosur	  
2	   Meats	   5,460	   4,670	   184	   86%	   3%	   14.9%	  
4	   Milk,	  dairy	  products	   3,502	   3,359	   3	   96%	   0%	   2.3%	  





3,409	   2,860	   25	   84%	   1%	   5.7%	  
22	   Alcoholic	  beverages,	  vinegar	   7,850	   6,050	   105	   77%	   1%	   1.9%	  
Total	   24,196	   20,568	   318	   85%	   1.3%	   1.8%	  
(1)  The	  shares	  in	  the	  bottom	  line	  are	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  total	  in	  column	  3.	  
Source:	  Data	  from	  Trademap.	  
III.	  Impact	  of	  a	  HB	  on	  UK	  agro	  industrial	  trade	  
	   Relying	  on	  average	  MFN	  tariff	  rates	  and	  import	  elasticities	  at	  the	  two-­‐digit	  level	  
of	  the	  HS,	  Lawless	  and	  Morgenroth	  (2016)	  have	  estimated	  that	  a	  HB	  would	  reduce	  UK-­‐
EU	  aggregate	  trade	  somewhere	  between	  22%	  and	  31%.13	  In	  this	  section	  we	  use	  these	  
authors’	   data	   for	   distinguishing	   between	   the	   impact	   of	   a	   HB	   on	   agro	   industrial	  
products	   (first	   24	   HS	   chapters),	   and	   the	   rest	   (HS	   chapters	   25	   to	   99)	   which	   we	   call	  
manufactures.	  We	  also	  present	  simulations	  of	  impacts	  at	  the	  more	  disaggregated	  level	  
of	  HS	  chapters.	  	  
The	   third	   column	   of	   Table	   4	   shows	   the	   simple	   average	  MFN	   tariffs	   for	   agro	  
industrial	   and	   manufactured	   products	   while	   the	   fourth	   column	   includes	   the	   simple	  
average	   proportional	   trade	   reduction	   effect	   of	   a	   HB14.	   The	   important	   difference	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  The	  extent	   to	  which	   the	  methodology	  used	  by	  Lawless	  and	  Morgenroth	   (2016)	  offers	  more	  precise	  
forecasts	   than	   the	  alternative	  of	  gravity	  equations	   that	   characterizes	  most	   studies,	  has	  been	  carefully	  
analyzed	  by	  Gudgin	  et.	  al.	  (2017).	  Their	  results	  emphasize	  the	  reason	  why	  the	  study	  by	  the	  UK	  Treasury	  
(2016)	   seriously	   overestimates	   the	   negative	   trade	   effects	   of	   a	   HB	   as	   it	   overlooked	   the	   fact	   that	   on	  
average	  after	   joining	   the	  EU,	   the	  UK	  harvested	   lower	  benefits	   in	   trade	   in	  goods	   than	  other	  members.	  
After	   adjusting	   for	   this	   omission	   and	   reestimating	   the	   gravity	   equations	   initially	   presented	   in	   HM	  
Treasury	  (2016),	  Gudgin	  et.	  al.	  (2017)	  conclude	  that	  the	  aggregate	  impact	  of	  a	  HB	  estimated	  by	  Lawless	  
and	  Morgenroth	  (2016)	  “…	  based	  solely	  on	  tariffs	  may	  thus	  be	  nearer	  the	  true	  impact	  than	  any	  estimate	  
based	  on	  gravity	  models…”	  (p	  32).	  
14For	   HS	   chapter	   i	   the	   proportional	   trade	   reduction	   effect	   of	   a	   HB	   is	   estimated	   by	   the	   following	  
expression:	  ∆Mi/Mi=tixei	  where	  M:	  value	  of	  UK	  imports	  from	  the	  EU;	  t:	  EU	  MFN	  tariff	  rate,	  and	  e;	  import	  
demand	  elasticity.	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between	  the	  trade	  impacts	  of	  a	  HB	  on	  both	  of	  these	  groups	  (50%	  vs	  22%)15	  is	  to	  a	  great	  
extent	   the	  consequence	  of	  an	  average	  MFN	  tariff	   for	  agro	   industrial	  products	   that	   is	  
four	   times	   the	   level	   for	  manufactures	   (16%	   vs	   4%).	   Under	   these	   assumptions,	   using	  
2016	  trade	  figures,	  a	  HB	  would	  reduce	  UK	  agro	  industrial	  imports	  from	  the	  EU	  by	  USD	  
21,653	  million.	  Under	  a	  HB	  UK’s	  agro	  industrial	  exports	  to	  the	  EU	  would	  also	  decline	  by	  
around	   50%.	   In	   2016	   the	   UK	   exported	   agro	   industrial	   products	   for	   a	   total	   of	   USD	  
17,503	   million	   so	   a	   HB	   would	   leave	   this	   trade	   at	   around	   USD	   8,750	   million.	   The	  
resulting	  negative	  net	  trade	  effect	  of	  around	  USD	  13,000	  million	  is	  still	  significant.	  
Table	  4:	  Simple	  averages	  EU	  MFN	  tariff	  rates	  and	  trade	  reduction	  impacts	  of	  a	  HB	  on	  
UK	  imports	  of	  agro	  industrial	  and	  manufactured	  products	  from	  the	  EU:	  2016	  (million	  
USD)	  
Products	   HS	  chapters	  
Simple	  average	  










Agro	  industrial	   1-­‐24	   16%	   49.8%	   43,480	   21,653	  
Manufactures	   25-­‐99	   4%	   22.3%	   287,126	   64,029	  
Source:	   Average	   MFN	   tariffs	   and	   import	   reduction	   effects	   have	   been	   inferred	   from	   Lawless	   and	  
Morgenroth	  (2016)	  as	  explained	  in	  Appendix	  A.	  Trade	  data	  from	  Trademap.	  
	   Table	  5	  shows	  average	  MFN	  tariffs	  for	  the	  same	  five	  HS	  agro	  industrial	  chapters	  
listed	  above	  in	  table	  3.	  Except	  for	  alcoholic	  beverages,	  the	  tariffs	  for	  the	  other	  chapters	  
are	  very	  high	  with	  meats	  and	  dairy	  products	  being	  the	  most	  protected.	   In	  fact,	  these	  
chapters	  have	   the	  highest	  and	   fourth	  highest	  MFN	   tariffs	  among	   the	  99	  HS	  chapters	  
computed	   by	   Lawless	   and	   Morgenroth	   (2016).	   Moving	   from	   near	   free	   trade	   to	  
adoption	   of	   these	   high	  MFN	   tariffs	  would	   trigger	   a	   71%	   reduction	   of	   UK	   imports	   of	  
these	   products	   from	   the	   EU	   or	   by	   USD	   14,996	   at	   2016	   prices	   (from	   USD	   21,117	  
million).	  Applying	  the	  same	  proportional	  reduction	  effects	  to	  the	  UK	  exports	  to	  the	  EU	  
leaves	  a	  net	  trade	  deficit	  of	  around	  USD	  9,600	  million	  with	  meat	  and	  preparations	  of	  
fruits	  and	  vegetables	  experiencing	  the	  highest	  negative	  net	  trade	  reduction	  effects.	  
	   Some	   words	   of	   caution	   regarding	   these	   estimates	   are	   in	   order.	   First,	   within	  
each	  chapter	  there	  usually	  are	  several	  products	  and	  their	  individual	  tariff	  rates	  can	  be	  
quite	  different	  than	  the	  average	  rate.	  For	  example,	  in	  appendix	  B	  we	  estimate	  that	  the	  
MFN	  tariff	   for	  frozen	  bovine	  meat	  (HS	  020230)	   is	  close	  to	  double	  the	  simple	  average	  
rate	   corresponding	   to	   the	   meat	   chapter	   (HS	   02).	   Depending	   on	   the	   patterns	   of	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  table	  4,	  the	  weighted	  average	  impact	  on	  UK’s	  aggregate	  trade	  impact	  of	  a	  HB	  is	  26%	  a	  
number	  that	  is	  in	  the	  neighbourhood	  of	  estimates	  presented	  in	  Gudgin	  et.	  al.	  (2016).	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Table	  5:	  Average	  EU	  MFN	  tariff	  rates	  and	  trade	  reduction	  effects	  of	  a	  HB	  
HS	  






























02	   Meats	   49.3	   92.9%	   4,670	   4,338	   1,592	   1,479	   -­‐2,859	  





15.1	   85.7%	   3,629	   3,110	   1,360	   1,166	   -­‐1,944	  
20	  
Preparations	  
of	  fruits	  and	  
vegetables	  





3.9	   38.1%	   6,050	   2,305	   3,725	   1,419	   -­‐886	  
na	   Total	   na	   na	   21,117	   14,996	   8,153	   5,395	   -­‐9,601	  
na:	  not	  applicable.	  
Source:	  MFN	  tariffs	  and	  import	  reduction	  effects	  have	  been	  inferred	  from	  Lawless	  and	  Morgenroth	  
(2016)	  as	  explained	  in	  Appendixes	  A.	  Trade	  data	  from	  Trademap.	  
Second,	  our	  estimates	  have	  not	  been	  adjusted	  for	  macroeconomic	  effects	  such	  as	  the	  
depreciation	  of	  the	  pound	  that	  Brexit	  has	  already	   induced.	  Third,	  estimates	  have	  not	  
taken	  into	  account	  that	  post	  Brexit	  UK-­‐EU	  agro	  industrial	  trade	  may	  have	  to	  overcome	  
higher	  non	  tariff	  barriers	  (NTBs)	  than	  existing.	  In	  fact,	  the	  study	  by	  Bellora	  et.	  al.	  (2017)	  
indicates	   that	   for	   many	   individual	   agro	   industrial	   products,	   NTBs	   are	   of	   greater	  
importance	  than	  the	  MFN	  tariffs	  (table	  4	  p	  22)	  and	  a	  HB	  could	  make	  these	  even	  more	  
costly.	  This	   is	  part	  of	  the	  reason	  why	  Bellora	  et.	  al.	   (2017)	   find	  an	   impact	  of	  a	  HB	  on	  
agro	  industrial	  trade	  of	  62%	  which	  is	  higher	  than	  our	  estimate	  of	  50%16.	  Fourth	  we	  are	  
also	  not	   taking	   into	  account	   the	   fact	   that	  post	  Brexit	  UK-­‐EU	   trade	  will	   have	   to	  meet	  
rules	   of	   origin	   and	   most	   likely	   some	   trade	   flows	   will	   also	   come	   to	   be	   affected	   by	  
antidumping	  measures	  both	  of	  which	  will	  add	  further	  costs	  to	  bilateral	  trade	  over	  and	  
above	   the	  MFN	   tariffs17.	   Fifth,	   our	   aggregate	   impact	   estimates	   are	   based	   on	   simple	  
averages	  of	  MFN	  tariffs	  and	  proportional	  trade	  reduction	  effects	  but,	  had	  we	  worked	  
with	  weighted	  averages	  numbers,	   the	   trade	   impacts	  would	  had	  been	  even	  greater18.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  This	  study	  concludes	  that	  UK-­‐EU	  trade	  of	  agro	  industrial	  products	  face	  high	  average	  equivalents	  of	  the	  
restrictive	  effects	  of	  NTBs.	  For	  example,	  for	  phitosanitary	  certification	  this	  study	  report	  tariff	  equivalent	  
of	  14%	  and	  26%	  for	  EU	  trade	  of	  manufactures	  and	  agro	  industrial	  products	  respectively.	  	  
17There	  also	  are	  uncertainties	  regarding	  how	  the	  tariff-­‐quotas	  will	  be	  divided	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  
UK	  (Revell	  2017).	  	  
18	  For	  agro	  industrial	  products	  the	  weighted	  average	  trade	  reduction	  effects	  is	  63.4%	  using	  imports	  from	  
the	  EU	  and	  59.8%	  using	  imports	  from	  the	  world.	  Both	  of	  these	  contrast	  with	  the	  50%	  we	  have	  used	  in	  
table	  4.	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Sixth,	  import	  elasticities	  could	  be	  non	  linear	  functions	  of	  the	  tariff	  height.	  Finally,	  there	  
are	  the	  usual	  shortcomings	  associated	  with	  a	  partial	  equilibrium	  model.	  
Note	  that	  had	  we	  included	  the	  non	  tariff	  costs	  –	  such	  as	  compliance	  with	  more	  
restrictive	  sanitary	  and	  phitosanitary	  regulations	  that	  a	  HB	  may	  create	  and	  with	  rules	  
of	  origin-­‐,	   the	  trade	   impact	  would	  had	  been	  even	  more	  negative	  than	  what	  we	  have	  
reported.	   So	   other	   things	   equal,	   we	   consider	   our	   estimates	   to	   be	   conservative	   that	  	  
show	  an	  important	  impact	  that	  a	  HB	  would	  have	  on	  UK-­‐EU	  trade.	  
Finally,	   Brexit	   implies	   a	   reformulation	   of	   UK	   agricultural	   policies	   away	   from	  
direct	  subsidies	  under	  the	  CAP	  to	  more	  market	  based	  incentives	  (section	  v).	  Eventually	  
the	  new	  policies	  may	  improve	  the	  export	  opportunities	  of	  third	  countries	  but	  it	  is	  yet	  
too	  early	  to	  tell.	  
IV.	  Mercosur’s	  trade	  negotiations	  with	  the	  EU	  	  
Paraguay	   and	   Uruguay	   have	   long	   motivated	   Argentina	   and	   Brazil	   to	   move	  
forward	   with	   the	   Mercosur	   trade	   negotiations.	   Nevertheless,	   under	   populist	  
governments	   these	   countries	   (particularly	   Argentina)	   reversed	   their	   earlier	   trade	  
liberalization	  programs	  and	  for	  a	  decade	  or	  so	  up	  to	  late	  2015,	  its	  salient	  policy	  was	  to	  
admit	  highly	   troubled	  Venezuela	   into	   the	  group.	  Populism	  brought	  not	  only	  external	  
paralysis	   to	   the	   group	   but	   also	   and	   what	   has	   been	   more	   destructive,	   a	   significant	  
retrogression	  within-­‐market	   liberalization	  and	  flagrant	  violations	  of	  multilateral	  rules.	  
Argentina	  by	  imposing	  quantitative	  restrictions	  on	  all	  imports	  and	  since	  early	  2006,	  on	  
major	  exportables	  (including	  bovine	  meat,	  wheat	  and	  maize),	  violated	  not	  only	  the	  CET	  
(common	  external	  tariff),	  but	  also	  several	  WTO	  agreements,	  a	  behaviour	  that	  brought	  
several	  Members	  to	  challenge	  such	  actions	  at	  the	  WTO	  dispute	  settlement	  mechanism	  
(Nogués	  2015).	  	  
Under	   recently	   appointed	   new	   governments	   these	   countries	   are	   now	   more	  
sympathetic	  to	  outward-­‐oriented	  policies	  and	  Mercosur	  is	  once	  again	  moving	  forward	  
with	  its	  trade	  negotiating	  agenda.	  In	  addition	  to	  adding	  impetus	  and	  enthusiasm	  to	  the	  
vintage-­‐old	  discussions	  with	  the	  EU,	  trade	  talks	  have	  been	  initiated	  with	  UK	  (Euractiv	  
2016),	   Canada	   (Government	   of	   Canada	   2018,	   and	   other	   countries19.	   The	   economic	  
complementarity	   between	   the	   economies	   of	   Mercosur	   and	   the	   EU	   have	   long	   been	  
noticed:	  Mercosur	  holding	  a	  strong	  comparative	  advantage	  in	  agro	  industrial	  products	  
while	  the	  EU	  showing	  its	  stronghold	  mostly	  in	  manufactures,	  services	  and	  intellectual	  
property.	  Despite	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  gains	  that	  could	  be	  achieved	  by	  an	  ambitious	  
FTA	  between	  these	  partners,	  after	  more	  than	  fifteen	  years	  since	  the	  initial	  exchange	  of	  
market	  offers	  took	  place,	  these	  negotiations	  remain	  to	  be	  completed20.	  On	  the	  surface	  
and	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  Mercosur,	  one	  of	  the	  salient	  reasons	  for	  this	  situation	  has	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  For	  a	  list	  of	  ongoing	  Mercosur	  trade	  negotiations	  see	  www.sice.oas.gov	  .	  
20	  This	  exchange	  took	  place	   in	  2001	  at	  the	  IV	  Meeting	  of	  the	  Birregional	  Negotiating	  Committee	  (BNC,	  
Comite	  Birregional	  de	  Negociaciones).	  Since	  then,	  the	  BNC	  has	  met	  more	  than	  twenty	  additional	  times	  
but	  still	  to	  no	  avail.	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been	  the	  EU	  unwillingness	  to	  offer	  concessions	  in	  agro	  industrial	  products	  of	  an	  order	  
of	  magnitude	  that	  would	  translate	  into	  a	  balanced	  agreement21.	  	  
Since	  the	  early	  millennium	  years,	  it	  has	  been	  clear	  that	  the	  EU	  would	  not	  shock	  
its	  agricultural	  producers	  in	  order	  to	  accommodate	  Mercosur’s	  export	  interests.	  Since	  
then,	  three	  events	  have	  reduced	  even	  more	  the	  likelihood	  of	  the	  EU	  coming	  closer	  to	  
Mercosur’s	  revealed	  market	  access	  demands.	  First,	  the	  trade	  effects	  of	  the	  2004,	  2007	  
and	  2013	  enlargements	  of	  the	  EU	  to	  central	  and	  eastern	  European	  countries	  many	  of	  
which	  had	  comparative	  advantage	  in	  agro	  industrial	  products	  (Anderson	  and	  Swinnen	  
2009,	  and	  Ciain	  and	  Swinnen	  2007).	  These	  enlargements	   increased	  the	  share	  of	   intra	  
EU28	   agro	   industrial	   trade	   resulting	   in	   a	   higher	   degree	   of	   self	   sufficiency	   to	   the	  
detriment	  of	   competitive	  agricultural	  exporters	   (Drabik	  and	  others	  2007	  and	  Nogués	  
2018)22.	  Graph	  2	  illustrates	  that	  with	  ups	  and	  downs,	  in	  these	  products	  since	  2001	  the	  
EU	  has	  become	  increasingly	  self-­‐sufficient.	  
Second,	   the	   far	   reaching	   EU-­‐Canada	   FTA	   (CETA	   for	   Comprehensive	   Economic	  
and	   Trade	   Agreement)	   that	   entered	   into	   force	   in	   September	   2017	   has	   been	  
characterized	  as	  ambitious	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  market	  access	  concessions	  given	  by	  the	  EU	  
in	  agro	   industrial	  products	   (Government	  of	  Canada	  2017,	   and	  European	  Commission	  
2017)23.	  This	  agreement	  has	  reduced	  the	  market	  space	  that	  the	  EU	  can	  offer	  to	  other	  
efficient	   exporters	   including	  Mercosur.	   Under	   CETA	  many	   agro	   industrial	   tariff	   lines	  
where	  Mercosur	   is	   competitive,	   have	   been	   liberalized	   including	   fresh	   apples,	   animal	  
feed,	  wheat	  flower,	  and	  dairy	  products.	  
Also,	  under	  CETA	  Canada	   is	  allowed	  to	  raise	   its	  exports	  to	  the	  EU	   in	  stages	  to	  
50,000	  tons	  of	  duty-­‐free	  beef,	  as	  well	  as	  80,000	  tons	  of	  pork	  (Reuters	  2017a).	  The	  beef	  
quota	   is	   only	   20,000	   tons	   lower	   than	   that	   offered	   to	   Mercosur	   but	   while	   in	   2016	  
Canada’s	  world	  beef	  exports	  amounted	  to	  309	  thousand	  tons	  (fresh	  and	  frozen	  bovine	  
meat	  HS	  0201+0202),	  Mercosur’s	  was	  8,918	   thousand	   tons	   i.e.	   29	   times	  higher	   than	  
Canada’s!	  
Finally,	  because	  as	  seen	  above	  Brexit	  will	  reduce	  EU’s	  agro	  industrial	  exports	  to	  
the	  UK	  quite	  significantly,	  the	  resulting	  excess	  supply	  will	  put	  downward	  pressures	  on	  
continental	   food	   prices	   increasing	   the	   already	   high	   resistance	   by	   these	   farmers	   to	  
further	  import	  competition24.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Several	  media	  articles	  have	  informed	  about	  these	  tensions	  adding	  specifically	  that	  the	  size	  of	  the	  EU	  
beef	   quota	   offered	   to	   Mercosur	   remains	   a	   sticking	   point.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   we	   say	   “apparently”	  
because	  the	  slow	  pace	  of	  progress,	   is	   functional	  to	  highly	  protected	  and	  politically	  powerful	  Mercosur	  
industries	   (particularly	   in	   Argentina	   and	   Brazil),	   that	   in	   the	   event	   of	   a	   trade	   agreement	  would	   suffer	  
displacements	  by	  imports	  from	  the	  EU.	  	  
22	  These	  new	  acceding	  countries	  had	  to	  increase	  the	  rate	  of	  assistance	  to	  their	  agro	  industrial	  sectors	  up	  
to	  the	  level	  mandated	  by	  the	  CAP	  triggering	  trade	  diversion	  effects.	  For	  example,	  Drabik	  at.	  al.	   	  (2007)	  
have	  noted	  that:	  “…	  a	  review	  of	  the	  detailed	  data	  shows	  that	  there	  are	  many	  cases	  when	  the	  gradual	  
liberalization	   increased	   Slovakia’s	   agricultural	   imports	   from	   the	   EU15	   +	   CEEC	   (Central	   and	   Eastern	  
European	   Countries)	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   Slovakia	   agricultural	   imports	   from	   the	   ROW	  
decreased…This	  is	  an	  indication	  that	  imports	  from	  the	  EU15	  +	  CEEC,	  which	  are	  positively	  discriminated	  
against,	  replaced	  imports	  from	  the	  ROW,	  an	  indication	  of	  trade	  diversion”.	  Also	  Nogués	  (2018).	  
23	  Geopolitics	  may	  have	  played	  a	  role	  in	  this	  FTA	  as	  Canada	  together	  with	  the	  US	  and	  the	  UK	  were	  the	  
three	  countries	  whose	  soldiers	  disembarked	  during	  D	  day	  in	  Normandy.	  	  
24	  This	  resistance	  has	  been	  made	  quite	  clear	  by	  France	  and	  other	  members.	  See	  for	  example	  RFI	  (2018).	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Graph	  2:	  EU28	  agro	  industrial	  imports	  from	  the	  EU28	  as	  percent	  of	  aggregate	  EU	  agro	  
industrial	  imports	  (USD)	  
	  
Source:	  Data	  from	  Trademap.	  
	  
These	   declining	   incentives	   for	   the	   EU	   to	   offer	   the	   sufficient	  market	   space	   to	  
Mercosur	  in	  order	  to	  arrive	  at	  an	  agreement	  on	  the	  agro	  industrial	  chapter	  of	  the	  FTA	  
under	  negotiation	  is	  made	  nowhere	  more	  clear	  than	  in	  the	  case	  of	  beef.	  According	  to	  
Mathews	   (2018)	   “…The	   EU	   has	   gradually	   reduced	   the	   proposed	   amount	   of	   beef	   it	  
would	  accept	  from	  the	  Mercosur	  from	  100,000	  tons	  per	  year	  in	  2004,	  to	  78,000	  tons	  in	  
2016,	  to	  70,000	  tons	  in	  2017”.	  Much	  of	  this	  beef	  would	  had	  been	  destined	  to	  the	  UK	  
market	  as	  within	  the	  EU	  this	  country	  is	  the	  second	  most	  important	  beef	  importer	  after	  
Germany.	   Nevertheless,	   after	   the	   UK	   leaves	   the	   EU,	   this	   beef	   will	   have	   to	   be	   sold	  
domestically	   depressing	   its	   prices25.	  Mathews	   (2018)	   adds	   that	   “…Brexit	   also	  makes	  
the	  EU	  a	  less	  attractive	  potential	  partner,	  and	  may	  make	  it	  more	  difficult	  for	  the	  EU	  to	  
negotiate	  as	  favourable	  terms	  in	  future	  trade	  deals	  as	  it	  might	  otherwise	  have	  done…”	  
(p	  12)26.	  
Brexit	  brings	  other	  bad	  news	  for	  EU	  farmers	  as	  the	  UK	  puts	  more	   into	  the	  EU	  
budget	   than	   it	   takes	   from	   it.	   Preliminary	  estimates	   suggest	   that	  unless	  other	  donors	  
meaning	  Germany	  in	  particular,	  close	  the	  funding	  shortfall	  implied	  by	  Brexit,	  farmers	  in	  
the	  continent	  could	  face	  an	  average	  cut	  in	  the	  CAP	  subsidies	  they	  are	  now	  receiving	  by	  
around	  5%	  (Reuters	  2017).	  
Therefore,	   if	   in	   the	   early	   years	   of	   the	   millennium	   a	   balanced	   and	   ambitious	  
Mercosur-­‐EU	   FTA	   essentially	   meaning	   a	   high	   degree	   of	   access	   to	   the	   EU’s	   agro	  
industrial	   market	   in	   exchange	   for	   concessions	   in	   manufactures,	   services	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Although	  the	  impact	  of	  Brexit	  on	  the	  UK	  macroeconomy	  may	  be	  quite	  negative,	  studies	  show	  that	  this	  
will	   not	  be	   the	   case	  on	   individual	   countries	   in	   Europe.	   The	  one	  exception	   is	   Ireland	  who	   is	   the	  major	  
meat	  exporter	  to	  the	  UK	  (Bellora	  et.	  al.	  2017).	  
26During	  2016	  UK	  beef	  imports	  from	  the	  EU	  amounted	  to	  USD	  4,670	  million	  and	  a	  HB	  would	  eliminate	  
most	   of	   this	   trade	   pushing	   lower	   beef	   prices	   in	   the	   continent.	   To	   some	   extent	   this	   impact	  would	   be	  
compensated	  by	  lower	  UK	  beef	  exports	  to	  the	  EU	  but	  there	  still	  remains	  a	  significant	  negative	  net	  trade	  
impact	  (table	  5).	  The	  EU	  could	  also	  try	  to	  seek	  new	  buyers	   in	   international	  markets	  for	   its	  excess	  food	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intellectual	  property,	  remained	  a	  long	  shot,	  these	  three	  events	  (the	  EU	  enlargements	  
to	  central	  and	  eastern	  European	  countries;	  the	  EU-­‐Canada	  FTA	  and	  most	  importantly,	  
the	  trade	  and	  financial	  consequences	  of	  Brexit)	  have	  put	  such	  a	  goal	  even	  further	  out	  
of	   reach27.	  What	   once	  may	   have	   appeared	   to	   be	   a	   promising	   economic	   program	   of	  
trade	  liberalization	  has	  since	  become	  increasingly	  unlikely	  and	  now	  in	  Mercosur’s	  trade	  
negotiations	  with	  Europe	  a	  balanced	  trade	  agreement	  appears	  to	  be	  more	  in	  the	  reach	  
of	  being	  achieved	  with	  the	  UK	  than	  with	  the	  EU.	  Perhaps	  given	  these	  factors	  and	  the	  
uncertainties	   that	   populist	   forces	   have	   brought	   into	   the	   institutional	   foundations	   of	  
the	  EU,	  the	  priority	  of	  Mercosur’s	  negotiations	  with	  these	  two	  partners	  may	  have	  to	  be	  
reconsidered	  in	  order	  to	  get	  the	  highest	  payoff	  from	  the	  scarce	  negotiating	  resources	  
it	  has	  at	  its	  disposal28.	  
V.	  About	  a	  Mercosur-­‐UK	  FTA	  
	   In	   agro	   industrial	   products	   Mercosur	   and	   the	   UK	   are	   also	   complementary	  
economies	   so	   given	   their	   size,	   the	   gains	   from	   an	   FTA	   would	   be	   quite	   important,	  
perhaps	  more	   than	   any	   other	   trade	   deal	   being	   considered	   except	   with	   the	   EU29.	   In	  
addition	   to	   these	   potential	   gains	   that	   could	   be	   reaped	   from	   the	   consequences	   of	  
Brexit,	  a	  number	  of	  non-­‐economic	  considerations	  also	  make	  the	  UK	  market	  attractive.	  
After	  summarizing	  them,	  we	  discuss	  briefly	  the	  future	  of	  the	  UK’s	  agricultural	  policies.	  
Finally,	  as	  an	  example	  of	  the	  trade	  significance	  of	  Brexit	  we	  look	  in	  greater	  detail	  at	  the	  
export	  prospects	  of	  different	  meat	  products	  and	  offer	  a	  back	  of	  the	  envelope	  estimate	  
of	  how	  a	  HB	  could	   impinge	  upon	  Mercosur’s	  exports	  of	  these	  products	  as	  well	  as	  on	  
agro-­‐industrial	  exports	  more	  generally.	  
Non-­‐economic	  considerations	  
Three	  non-­‐economic	   considerations	  make	   the	  UK	  attractive	  as	  a	  partner	  with	  
whom	   to	   complete	   a	   relevant	   FTA.	   First,	   Brexit	   has	   a	   concrete	   deadline:	  March	   29,	  
2019	  with	  a	   transition	  period	   lasting	  until	  December	  31,	  2020.	  This	   is	   important	  and	  
quite	   unique	   among	   trade	   negotiations	   that	   generally	   have	   no	   deadline	   to	   be	  
completed	  and	  as	  has	  been	  the	  case	  between	  Mercosur	  and	  the	  EU,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  
deadlines	   they	   could	   drag	   on	   for	   years.	   Second,	   the	   broad	   nature	   of	   the	   market	  
exchange	   that	   would	   characterize	   a	   Mercosur-­‐UK	   FTA	   is	   expected	   not	   to	   be	   very	  
different	  from	  the	  exchange	  being	  discussed	  with	  the	  EU:	  essentially	  a	  liberalization	  of	  
Mercosur’s	   services,	   protected	   manufactures	   and	   strengthening	   of	   intellectual	  
property	   in	   exchange	   for	   greater	   access	   to	   agro	   industrial	   markets.	   Therefore,	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27From	  the	  standpoint	  of	  the	  EU,	  suggestions	  from	  academic	  circles	  that	  it	  should	  be	  less	  ambitious	  than	  
seeking	   an	   FTA	  have	   also	   been	  made	   (for	   example,	  Messerlin	   2013).	   In	   part,	   this	   view	  was	   driven	   by	  
concerns	   regarding	   the	   uncertain	   spirit	   of	   openness	   that	   Mercosur	   showed	   at	   the	   time.	   It	   was	   also	  
driven	  by	  concerns	  regarding	  the	  important	  trade	  diversion	  effects	  that	  such	  an	  agreement	  would	  cause	  
on	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world.	  	  
28	   It	   has	  now	  been	   several	   years	   since	   the	  objectives	  of	   the	   founding	   fathers	  of	   European	   integration	  
appear	  to	  be	  challenged	  by	  problems	  that	  could	  not	  be	  foreseen	  at	  the	  time.	  See	  Germond	  (2009)	  for	  an	  
historical	  discussion.	  
29	  In	  practically	  all	  the	  first	  24	  chapters	  of	  the	  HS,	  where	  the	  UK	  records	  a	  trade	  deficit,	  Mercosur	  shows	  
a	  surplus.	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experience	  gained	  through	  years	  of	  negotiating	  with	  the	  EU	  can	  fruitfully	  be	  used	  for	  
talks	  with	  the	  UK	  and	  this	  is	  certainly	  a	  time-­‐saving	  factor.	  Third,	  given	  that	  the	  UK	  GDP	  
is	  approximately	  one	  fifth	  the	  size	  of	  the	  EU,	  Mercosur’s	  concessions	  offered	  to	  the	  UK	  
need	  not	  be	  as	   important	  as	  those	  demanded	  by	  the	  EU.	  This	  should	  help	  to	  placate	  
domestic	   pressures	   thereby	   facilitating	   a	   transparent	   negotiation	   and	   reaching	   a	  
balanced	  agreement.	  	  
Finally,	   a	   draft	   FTA	   with	   the	   UK	   should	   be	   easy	   to	   have	   ratified	   by	   the	   five	  
countries	   particularly	   given	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   UK	   government	   has	   expressed	   quite	  
clearly	   that	   upon	   leaving	   the	   EU,	   it	  will	   be	  moving	   to	   a	  market-­‐oriented	   agricultural	  
sector	  much	  as	  it	  was	  before	  joining	  the	  EU.	  These	  aspects	  (concrete	  Brexit	  deadlines;	  
accumulated	  negotiating	  experience	  with	  the	  EU;	  the	  possibility	  of	  reaching	  a	  balanced	  
exchange	   of	   concessions	   and,	   relative	   easiness	   of	   ratification)	   increase	   the	  
attractiveness	  of	  negotiating	  an	  FTA	  with	  the	  UK.	  
The	  future	  of	  the	  UK’s	  agricultural	  policies	  
	   Earlier	   this	   year,	   the	  UK	  Secretary	  of	   State	   for	   Environment,	   Food	  and	  
Rural	  Affairs	   (2018)	  presented	   to	   the	  Parliament	   a	   document	   for	   public	   consultation	  
entitled:	   “Health	   and	   Harmony:	   the	   future	   for	   food,	   farming	   and	   environment	   in	   a	  
green	  Brexit”.	  This	  document’s	  objectives	  for	  its	  agricultural	  sector	  depart	  loudly	  from	  
those	   that	   have	  prevailed	  under	   the	  CAP.	   Some	  excerpts	   from	   the	  prologue	   read	   as	  
follows:	   “For	  more	   than	   forty	   years	   the	   EU’s	   Common	   Agricultural	   Policy	   (CAP)	   has	  
decided	  how	  we	   farm	  our	   land,	   the	   food	  we	  grow	  and	   rear	   the	   state	  of	   the	  natural	  
environment.	   Over	   the	   period	   the	   environment	   has	   deteriorated,	   productivity	   has	  
been	  held	  back	  and	  public	  health	  has	  been	  compromised…	  The	  environmental	  damage	  
we	   have	   suffered	   while	   inside	   the	   CAP	   has	   been	   significant.	   Soil	   health	   has	  
deteriorated.	   Farmland	   bird	   numbers	   have	   dropped.	   Precious	   habitats	   have	   been	  
eroded…”30	  And	  CAP	   subsidies	   “…skewed	   to	   those	  with	   the	  biggest	   landholdings	  has	  
kept	  land	  prices	  and	  rents	  high	  …	  and	  held	  back	  innovation”	  (p	  5)31.	  
In	   this	  document	  the	  Government’s	  policy	  proposals	  are	  expected	  to	  result	   in	  
an	   agricultural	   sector	   that	   will	   be	   “…	   more	   dynamic,	   more	   self-­‐reliant	   agriculture	  
industry	   as	  we	   continue	   to	   compete	   internationally…”	   (p	   6).	   By	   dismantling	   the	  CAP	  
subsidies	  the	  post	  Brexit	  policy	  direction	  is	  towards	  a	  market-­‐oriented	  and	  competitive	  
agricultural	  sector	  and	  although	  subsidies	  are	  proposed	  to	  continue,	   they	  will	  not	  be	  
tied	  to	  land	  size	  as	  in	  the	  CAP	  but	  to	  environmental	  goals:	  the	  catch	  phrase	  is	  “public	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	   Similar	   and	   serious	   damages	   to	   the	   environment	   have	   also	   been	   registered	   in	   the	   continent	  which	  
have	  also	  been	  attributed	  to	  the	  CAP	  (Mathew	  2018).	  	  
31As	  has	  been	  the	  case	  with	  several	  central	  and	  eastern	  European	  countries,	  after	  joining	  the	  EU	  in	  1973	  
the	  UK	  had	   to	  adopt	   the	  highly	  protectionist	  CAP	  policies.	  The	  suggestion	   that	  decades	  of	  agricultural	  
policies	   under	   the	   CAP	   has	   not	   necessarily	   been	   good	   for	   UK	   agriculture	   has	   previously	   been	   made	  
among	  others	  by	  Buckwell	  (2016)	  who	  asserts	  that:	  “…Assembling	  lists	  of	  good	  and	  bad	  features	  of	  the	  
experience	   of	   42	   years	   under	   the	   CAP	   leads	   to	   the	   conclusion	   that	   the	   CAP	   has	   not	   been	   an	  
unambiguously	   ‘good	   thing’	   for	   UK	   farming,	   and	   prompts	   the	   thought	   that	   escaping	   the	   CAP	   per	   se	  
would	  not	  necessarily	  be	  a	  complete	  disaster”.	  Other	  critical	  views	  regarding	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  CAP	  on	  
the	  UK	  agricultural	  sector	  include	  Helm	  (2016),	  Swinbank	  (2017),	  and	  Financial	  Times	  (2017).	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money	   spent	   on	   public	   goods”32.Regarding	   trade	   policies,	   the	   proposal	   emphasizes	  
signing	   FTAs	   with	   countries	   that	   currently	   have	   agreements	   with	   the	   EU	   and	   also,	  
“…with	  a	  number	  of	  countries	  that	  have	  a	  keen	  interest	  in	  doing	  so…”	  (p	  62).	  
Brexit	  will	   impact	   on	   consumer	  prices	   generally	   and	   food	  prices	   in	   particular.	  
Research	  by	  Clarke	  et.	  al.	  (2017)	  concludes	  that	  under	  a	  HB	  food	  prices	  would	  rise	  well	  
above	  average	  inflation.	  These	  authors	  report	  the	  following	  adjustments	  of	  consumer	  
prices:	  dairy	  products:	  8%;	  oils	  and	  fats:	  8%	  and	  meat:	  6%.	  These	  adjustments	  are	  over	  
and	   above	   the	   impact	   that	   a	   lower	   pound	   has	   already	   had	   on	   prices.	   Clarke	   et.	   al.	  
(2017)	  also	  show	  how	  a	  Brexit	  induced	  food	  price	  inflation	  would	  be	  tilted	  against	  the	  
lowest	   quintiles	   and	   the	   unemployed.	   Confronted	   with	   such	   a	   situation	   the	   UK	   will	  
most	  likely	  move	  to	  liberalize	  trade	  and	  avoid	  such	  consequences33.	  
Also	  given	  that	  in	  the	  future,	  subsidies	  for	  agricultural	  related	  public	  goods	  will	  
have	   to	   compete	   with	   subsidies	   for	   other	   significant	   areas	   such	   as	   health	   and	  
education,	  it	  appears	  unlikely	  that	  public	  money	  for	  this	  sector	  will	  remain	  at	  the	  level	  
currently	  available	  under	  the	  CAP.	  The	  UK	  government	  has	  confirmed	  that	  such	  a	  level	  
will	  be	  maintained	  only	  until	  December	  31,	  2020	  but	  there	  is	  no	  commitment	  after	  this	  
date.	   Therefore,	  most	   likely,	   over	   time	   subsidies	   for	   the	   agricultural	   sector	  will	   start	  
declining	  from	  the	  current	  levels.	  	  
Assessing	  the	  trade	  opportunities:	  back	  of	  the	  envelope	  estimates	  
In	   assessing	   a	   Mercosur-­‐UK	   agreement	   it	   is	   also	   important	   to	   stress	   the	  
implications	  of	  the	  choice	  faced	  by	  the	  UK	  of	  eventually	  liberalizing	  unilaterally	  priority	  
sectors	   including	   perhaps	   some	   food	   products,	   or	   negotiating	   access	   to	   its	   market	  
through	   FTAs.	   Mercosur	   could	   certainly	   wait	   for	   unilateral	   liberalization	   but:	  Which	  
products	  would	  the	  UK	  liberalize	  first	  if	  any?	  By	  how	  much?	  Would	  these	  products	  be	  
the	  ones	  where	   the	  Mercosur	   countries	   show	  a	   strong	   comparative	   advantage?	   and	  
most	  importantly:	  How	  high	  would	  tariff	  discrimination	  against	  Mercosur	  exports	  be	  in	  
a	  non	  FTA	  scenario	  while	  other	  efficient	  exporters	  move	  in	  and	  sign	  FTAs	  with	  the	  UK?	  
In	   fact,	   talks	   are	   already	  moving	   forward	   with	   Australia	   (Bridges	   2017)	   and	   Canada	  
(Politico	   2018),	   and	   common	   sense	   suggests	   that	   FTAs	   with	   these	   countries	   will	   be	  
completed	  sooner	  rather	  than	  later.	  Therefore,	  the	  option	  of	  Mercosur	  waiting	  for	  the	  
UK	  to	  implement	  unilateral	  liberalization	  is	  risky	  and	  as	  has	  been	  the	  case	  with	  the	  EU	  
and	  other	  agreements,	  a	  late	  reaction	  is	  unlikely	  to	  retain	  the	  trade	  opportunities	  that	  
could	  now	  be	   seized.	   In	  what	   follows,	  we	  offer	   back	  of	   the	   envelope	  estimates	   that	  
illustrate	  the	  export	  opportunities	  that	  a	  HB	  could	  eventually	  open	  to	  Mercosur.	  
a)   Meat	  exports	  
As	   hinted	   above,	   the	   fact	   that	   in	   spite	   of	   the	   strong	   export	   performance	   of	  
Mercosur	  as	  the	   leading	  world	  meat	  exporter	   illustrated	   in	  graph	  3,	   the	  fraction	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  As	  agricultural	  policies	  are	  part	  of	  the	  devolved	  administration,	  the	  proposals	  in	  the	  document	  apply	  
to	  England	  while	  Scotland,	  Wales	  and	  Northern	  Ireland	  will	  be	  free	  to	  decide	  their	  own	  policies.	  Because	  
in	  these	  regions,	  the	  CAP	  subsidies	  provide	  the	  bulk	  of	  farmer’s	  income,	  dismantling	  and	  substituting	  it	  
for	  other	  forms	  of	  assistance	  will	  be	  quite	  more	  challenging	  (Mathews	  2018).	  
33For	  a	  number	  of	  reasons	  listed	  in	  their	  paper,	  Clarke	  et.	  al.	  (2017)	  conclude	  that	  their	  estimates	  of	  the	  
food	  price	  inflation	  that	  implementation	  of	  MFN	  tariffs	  is	  likely	  to	  trigger,	  are	  conservative.	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has	  gone	  to	  the	  EU	  is	  well	  out	  of	  proportion.	  In	  2016	  the	  EU	  imported	  meat	  for	  a	  total	  
of	   USD	   41,418	   million	   of	   which	   Mercosur’s	   share	   was	   5.4%.	   In	   that	   same	   year	  
Mercosur’s	  share	  in	  world	  meat	  exports	  was	  close	  to	  three	  times	  higher:	  14.9%.	  
Graph	  3:	  World	  meat	  exports	  
	  
Source:	  Trademap.	  
Graph	  4	  shows	  that	  the	  UK	  has	  increasingly	  relied	  on	  meat	  imports	  from	  the	  EU	  
and	  in	  2016	  the	  share	  from	  this	  origin	  reached	  86%	  (equivalent	  to	  USD	  4,670	  million)	  
while	  Mercosur’s	  share	  was	  equivalent	  to	  only	  3%.	  Although	  a	  number	  of	  factors	  can	  
account	  for	  this	  high	  degree	  of	  market	  specialization,	  the	  CAP	  is	  a	  primary	  suspect.	  In	  a	  
non	  CAP	  world	  these	  shares	  would	   likely	  be	  quite	  different	  and	  this	  assertion	  can	  be	  
partly	   supported	   by	   going	   back	   to	   2001	   before	   the	   EU	   enlargement	   to	   central	   and	  
eastern	   European	   countries.	   Then	   Mercosur’s	   share	   in	   UK’s	   meat	   imports	   was	   7%	  
(more	   than	   three	   times	   higher	   than	   in	   2016)	   while	   the	   EU15	   share	   was	   78%	   (9	  
percentage	  points	   lower	   than	   the	   share	   it	   had	   in	  2016).	   The	  EU	  enlargement	  goes	  a	  
long	  way	  in	  explaining	  the	  important	  decline	  in	  Mercosur’s	  share.	  For	  example,	  in	  2001	  
Poland,	  Rumania,	  Hungary	  and	  Bulgaria	  accounted	   for	  a	  mere	  0.1%	  of	   the	  UKs	  meat	  
imports	  but	  by	  2016	  their	  share	  had	  increased	  to	  14%.	  
Brexit	  will	  bring	  an	  end	  to	  these	  distortions	  in	  the	  UK	  market	  as	  this	  country	  will	  
begin	   importing	  on	  an	  MFN	  basis	  and/or	  under	  FTAs.	  This	  will	  be	  the	  first	   time	  since	  
1973	  when	   the	  UK	   joined	   the	   EU	   that	   third	   countries	   regain	   a	   level	   playing	   field	   (or	  
near	   to	   it)	   when	   competing	   with	   the	   EU	   in	   this	   market.	   How	   could	   this	   impact	   on	  
Mercosur’s	   exports?	   We	   look	   at	   the	   structure	   of	   meat	   trade	   and	   the	   level	   of	   agro	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Graph	  4:	  UK	  meat	  imports	  from	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  proportion	  of	  UK’s	  aggregate	  meat	  exports	  
	  
Source:	  Constructed	  with	  data	  in	  trademap.	  
Columns	  3	  and	  4	  of	  table	  6	  show	  UK	  imports	  from	  the	  EU	  for	  different	  kinds	  of	  
meats.	   Column	   5	   are	   estimates	   of	   MFN	   tariffs	   at	   the	   four-­‐digit	   level	   of	   the	   HS	  
(appendix	   B	   for	   the	   details).	   The	   numbers	   here	   show	   important	   differences	   ranging	  
from	   an	   average	   MFN	   tariff	   of	   31%	   for	   pig	   meat,	   to	   92%	   for	   frozen	   bovine	   meat.	  
Lacking	  more	  precise	  information,	  we	  have	  applied	  uniformly	  an	  import	  elasticity	  of	  -­‐	  
1.934	  and	  -­‐1.0.	  The	  resulting	  trade	  effects	  presented	  in	  column	  8	  confirms	  the	  finding	  
that	  a	  HB	  would	  curtail	  meat	  imports	  from	  the	  EU	  by	  83%	  in	  value	  terms,	  and	  by	  80%	  
in	   quantity	   terms	   (1.2	   million	   tons).The	   hardest	   hit	   imports	   would	   be	   chicken	   and	  
bovine	  meat	  and	  the	  EU	  exporters	  that	  would	  be	  most	  affected	  would	  be	  Netherlands	  
for	   chicken	   meat	   and	   Ireland	   for	   bovine	   meat	   (Donellan	   and	   Hanrahan	   2016,	   and	  
Swinbank	  2017).	  	  
Part	  of	   this	   import	  contraction	  would	  be	  compensated	  by	   lower	  exports	   from	  
the	  UK	  to	  the	  EU	  that	  Brexit	  would	  also	  trigger.	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  2016	  trade	  flows	  table	  
7	   shows	   that	   post	  HB,	   the	   net	   reduction	   in	  meat	   trade	  would	   be	  USD	   2,647	  million	  
concentrated	   in	   chicken	   meat,	   salted	   meat	   and	   fresh	   bovine	   meat.	   In	   terms	   of	  
quantities,	  a	  HB	  would	  result	   in	  a	  net	  trade	  reduction	  of	  the	  UK	  imports	  from	  the	  EU	  
equivalent	  to	  844,000	  tons.	  	  
Where	  could	  a	  HB	  leave	  Mercosur’s	  meat	  exports	  to	  the	  UK?	  Share	  analysis	  is	  a	  
simple	   way	   to	   provide	   a	   back	   of	   the	   envelope	   estimate.	   Under	   the	   following	  
assumptions	  and	  using	  2016	  trade	  data,	  Mercosur	  could	   increase	   its	  meat	  exports	  to	  
the	  UK	   quite	   significantly	   if:	   i)	   over	   time	   the	  UK	   returns	   to	   its	   pre	  HB	   level	   of	  meat	  
imports	   from	   the	   EU;	   ii)	   facilitated	   by	   years	   of	   common	   administration	   of	   the	   EU’s	  
NTBs	  and/or	  under	  an	  FTA,	  post	  a	  HB	  the	  EU	  would	  export25%	  of	  the	   increase	   in	  UK	  
imports	   that	   is	   assumed	   in	   (i)	   and,	   iii)	   third	   countries	   fill	   the	   remaining	   75%	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34This	  elasticity	   is	  not	  explicitly	  mentioned	   in	  Lawless	  and	  Morgenroth	  (2016)	  so	  we	  have	  estimated	   it	  
indirectly	  as	  indicated	  in	  appendix	  A.	  Recent	  estimates	  by	  Ghodsi	  and	  others	  (2016)	  suggest	  that	  import	  
demand	  elasticities	  by	  country	  and	  product	  usually	  fall	  within	  the	  range	  of	  those	  implicit	  in	  Lawless	  and	  
Morgenroth	  (2016).	  Nevertheless,	  greater	  precisions	  can	  certainly	  be	  gained	  by	  direct	  estimation	  of	  won	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proportion	   to	   their	   share	   in	   world	   meat	   exports	   net	   of	   intra	   EU	   trade35.	   In	   2016,	  
Mercosur’s	  share	  in	  world	  meat	  exports	  net	  of	  intra	  EU	  trade	  was	  20.0%.	  Applying	  this	  
proportion	   to	   the	   increase	   in	   the	  UK’s	  meat	   imports	  post	  a	  HB	  net	  of	   the	  EU	  supply	  
(USD	  2,960),	  yields	  USD	  592	  million	  of	  additional	  meat	  exports.	  This	  is	  more	  than	  three	  
times	  what	  Mercosur	  exported	  to	  this	  market	  in	  2016	  (USD	  184	  million)36.	  	  
Table	  6:	  EU	  MFN	  meat	  tariffs	  and	  impact	  of	  HB	  on	  UK	  imports	  from	  the	  EU	  
Note:	  For	  three	  sectors	  (0206,	  0208	  and,	  0209)	  we	  have	  assumed	  an	  MFN	  tariff	  equal	  to	  the	  weighted	  
average	  (by	  UK	  imports	  from	  the	  EU)	  of	  the	  other	  seven	  sectors.	  Parameter	  values	  indicate	  that	  in	  the	  
following	  sectors	  imports	  would	  decline	  by	  more	  than	  100%.	  The	  steps	  followed	  for	  estimating	  average	  
MFN	  tariff	  at	  the	  four-­‐digit	  level	  are	  detailed	  in	  Appendix	  B.	  
Source:	  Trade	  data	  from	  trademap	  and	  MFN	  tariffs	  from	  appendix	  B.	  
b)   Agro	  industrial	  exports	  
Under	   similar	   assumptions,	   following	   a	   HB,	   Mercosur	   would	   export	   an	  
additional	  USD	  1,500	  million	  of	  agro	  industrial	  products	  to	  the	  UK	  (share	  of	  Mercosur	  
in	  world	  agro	   industrial	  exports	  net	  of	   intra	  EU	   trade	  of	  11.3%	  times	   the	   level	  of	  UK	  
import	   contraction	   net	   of	   the	   25%	   to	   be	   supplied	   by	   the	   EU	   or	   USD	   16,240	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  We	  net	  trade	  with	  and	  intra	  EU	  under	  the	  assumption	  that	  most	  of	  it	  is	  trade	  diversion	  from	  
preferences	  under	  the	  high	  protective	  barriers	  of	  the	  CAP.	  
	  
36	  The	  US	  and	  Australia	  have	  quite	  similar	  shares	  to	  that	  of	  Mercosur’s	  but	  because	  these	  countries	  are	  
free	  of	  hoof	  and	  mouth	  disease	  without	  vaccination,	  they	  export	  beef	  at	  higher	  unit	  prices.	  
HS	  
line	   Product	  




UK	  import	  reduction	  
(tons)	  from	  EU	  
assuming	  import	  
elasticity	  of:	  
UK	  import	  reduction	  
(USD)	  from	  the	  EU	  






(tons)	   1,9	   1	   -­‐1.9	   -­‐1.0	  





193,093	   63,427	   92	   63.427	   58,353	   193,093	   177,646	  
0203	   Pig	  meat	   1,047,076	   438,464	   31	   258,255	   135,924	   616,728	   324,594	  
0204	   Sheep	  meat	   46,335	   9,913	   50	   9,417	   4,957	   44,018	   23,168	  
0205	   Horsemeat	   0	   0	   45	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
0206	   Meat	  residues	   45,418	   29,594	   47	   26,427	   13,909	   40,558	   21,346	  
0207	   Chicken	  meat	   1,519,218	   492,025	   41	   383,287	   201,730	   1,183,471	   622,879	  
0208	   Meats	  of	  rabbits,	  etc.	   16,277	   3,862	   47	   3,449	   1,815	   14,535	   7,650	  





775,066	   249,829	   55	   249,829	   137,406	   775,066	   426,286	  
Total	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   4,670,446	   1,474,192	   47	   1,180,288	   658,115	   3,894,602	   2178,530	  
	   18	  
million)37.This	  is	  close	  to	  double	  what	  it	  actually	  exported	  to	  the	  UK	  in	  this	  year:	  USD	  
1,723million.	  	  









Impact	  of	  Brexit	  on:	  (1)	  
Exports	   Imports	   Net	  trade	   Quantity	  (tons)	  
Fresh	  bovine	  
meat	   407,746	   1,020,205	   407,746	   1,020,205	   -­‐612,459	   -­‐136,557	  
Frozen	  
bovine	  meat	   48,679	   193,093	   48,679	   193,093	   -­‐144,414	   -­‐44,231	  
Pig	  meat	   216,433	   1,047,076	   135,638	   324,594	   -­‐190,956	   -­‐82,599	  
Sheep	  meat	   432,383	   46,335	   410,764	   410,183	   +581	   +105	  
Horse	  meat	   0	   0	   0	   0	   -­‐0	   0	  
Meat	  
residues	   54,476	   45,418	   48,647	   40,558	   +8,089	   +4,552	  
Chicken	  
meat	   234,049	   1,519,218	   182,324	   1,183,471	   -­‐1,001,147	   -­‐305,974	  
Meat	  of	  
rabbits	  etc.	   17,798	   16,277	   15,894	   14,535	   +1,359	   +279	  




68,500	   775,066	   68,500	   775,066	   -­‐706,566	   -­‐277,778	  
Total	   1,486,078	   4,670,446	  	   1,323,503	   (3864602)	  3,947,170	   -­‐2,647,130	   -­‐843,923	  
Note:	  (1)	  estimated	  with	  an	  import	  demand	  elasticity	  of	  -­‐1.9	  and	  the	  MFN	  tariffs	  in	  table	  6;	  
(2)	  quantities	  in	  the	  last	  column	  are	  estimated	  with	  unit	  values	  presented	  in	  appendix	  B.	  
Source:	  Author’s	  elaboration	  based	  on	  data	  from	  trademap.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  In	  2016	  the	  underlying	  numbers	  for	  meat	  and	  agro	  industrial	  products	  were	  as	  follows	  (USD	  million):	  
Trade	  flow	   Meat	   Agro	  industrial	  
Pre	  HB	  UK	  imports	  from	  EU	   4,670	   43,480	  
Post	  HB	  UK	  imports	  from	  EU	   723	   21,827	  
UK	  import	  contraction	   3,947	   21,653	  
UK	  import	  contraction	  net	  of	  25%	  
supplied	  by	  the	  EU	   2,960	   16,240	  
World	  exports	  net	  of	  intra	  EU	  trade	   74,895	   1,025,534	  
Country	  exports	  net	  of	  EU:	   	  	   	  	  
-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Mercosur	   14,950	   94,674	  
-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  US	   14,381	   128,053	  
-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Australia	   15,506	   28,749	  
-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Canada	   4,635	   47,667	  
-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  EU	  net	   11,395	   145,202	  
Source:	  Trademap.	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The	  extent	  to	  which	  Mercosur	  could	  reach	  these	  levels	  of	  exports	  depends	  on	  a	  
number	  of	  critical	  factors	  including	  whether:	  i)	  in	  fact	  the	  UK	  returns	  to	  the	  pre	  Brexit	  
level	  of	  agro	  industrial	   imports	  or	  close	  to	  it;	   ii)it	  can	  conclude	  an	  FTA	  with	  the	  UK	  at	  
par	  with	  other	  exporters	  like	  Australia	  and	  Canada;	  iii)	  it	  can	  meet	  the	  stringent	  quality	  
standards	   that	   will	   be	   demanded	   by	   the	   UK	   and,	   iv)	   it	   can	   maintain	   its	   growth	  
momentum	  by	  not	  discriminating	  heavily	  against	  its	  exports	  as	  Argentina	  did	  until	  late	  
201538.	  
VI.	  Final	  remarks	  
Given	   the	  high	  protection	  provided	  by	   the	  EU	   to	  agro	   industrial	  products,	  we	  
estimate	   that	   a	   hard	   Brexit	  would	   reduce	  UK	   imports	   from	   these	   countries	   by	   50%,	  
which	  is	  more	  than	  double	  the	  import	  contraction	  projected	  for	  manufactures	  (22%).	  
For	  the	  post	  Brexit	  years	  and	  following	  the	  dismantling	  of	  the	  CAP,	  the	  UK	  Government	  
has	  proposed	  implementing	  deep	  reforms	  to	  its	  agricultural	  policies	  moving	  towards	  a	  
more	  competitive	  sector.	  The	  Government	  has	  also	  announced	  its	  intention	  of	  signing	  
FTAs	  with	  efficient	  agricultural	  exporters	  and	  is	  already	  moving	  in	  this	  direction.	  Under	  
these	  policies,	  it	  appears	  likely	  that	  these	  exporters	  will	  fill	  most	  of	  the	  trade	  gap	  left	  
by	  imports	  from	  the	  EU	  and	  by	  so	  doing;	  the	  UK	  would	  avoid	  the	  food	  price	  inflation	  
that	  a	  hard	  Brexit	  would	  otherwise	  trigger.	  	  
Mercosur	  and	   the	  EU	  have	  been	  negotiating	  an	  FTA	   for	  close	   to	   two	  decades	  
but	   still	   to	   no	   avail.	   Three	   structural	   factors	   and	   policies	   help	   to	   understand	   the	  
increasing	   reluctance	   of	   the	   EU	   to	   offer	   concessions	   in	   agro	   industrial	   products	   at	   a	  
level	   close	   to	   what	   Mercosur	   countries	   seek	   for	   closing	   what	   these	   countries	  
apparently	  believe	  is	  required	  in	  order	  to	  close	  a	  relatively	  balanced	  agreement:	  1)	  the	  
enlargements	  of	   the	  EU	   to	   thirteen	  central	   and	  eastern	  European	  countries	  many	  of	  
them	  with	   comparative	   advantage	   in	   agricultural	   products;	   2)	   the	   numerous	   FTAs	   it	  
has	  signed	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  one	  with	  Canada	  that	  came	  into	  effect	  in	  late	  2017	  and	  
to	   whom	   the	   EU	   has	   offered	   relatively	   important	  market	   space	   and	   now,	   3)	   Brexit.	  
Therefore,	   if	   in	   the	  early	  millennium	  years,	  a	  balanced	  Mercosur-­‐EU	  FTA	   remained	  a	  
possibility,	  these	  events	  have	  put	  such	  a	  goal	  further	  out	  of	  reach.	  	  
We	  suggest	   that	   in	   the	  event	   that	  Mercosur	  countries	  want	   to	   truly	   liberalize	  
trade	  by	  gradually	  signing	  FTAs	  as	  several	  other	  Latin	  American	  countries	  have	  done,	  
then	   they	   should	   consider	   giving	   priority	   to	   negotiations	   with	   the	   UK.	   Back	   of	   the	  
envelope	   estimates	   indicate	   that	   these	   countries	   could	   close	   to	   double	   their	   agro	  
industrial	   exports	   to	   this	  market	  within	   a	   time	   horizon	   that	   currently	   appears	   to	   be	  
quite	  concrete	  and	  quite	  near.	  Delaying	  these	  negotiations	  runs	  the	  risks	  of	  Mercosur	  
loosing	  trade	  opportunities	  once	  again	  which	  are	  unlikely	  to	  be	  recouped	  later.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	   In	  response	  to	  high	  and	  discriminatory	  trade	  barriers	   including	  arbitrary	  export	  quotas	  administered	  
between	  2006	  and	  2015,	  Argentina’s	  cattle	  stock	  declined	  by	  around	  10	  million	  heads	  from	  60	  million.	  
As	  a	  consequence,	  the	  export/output	  ratio	  declined	  from	  around	  15%	  in	  the	  early	  millennium	  years	  to	  
7%	  shortly	  before	  the	  export	  barriers	  were	  lifted	  in	  late	  2015	  (Nogués	  2015).	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Appendix	  A:	  Basic	  data	  
	  
Table	  A	  shows	  the	  basic	  data	  on	  MFN	  tariffs	  and	  the	  proportional	  trade	  impacts	  
of	   Brexit	   used	   in	   the	   text	   which	   have	   been	   inferred	   from	   Lawless	   and	  Morgenroth	  
(2016)	  as	  clarified	  in	  the	  source	  of	  table	  A.	  In	  turn,	  the	  import	  demand	  elasticity	  for	  HS	  
chapter	  j	  (ej)	  has	  been	  deducted	  from	  the	  following	  expression:	  
	  ej=(∆Mj/Mj)/tjj	  (1)	  
	  where	   ∆Mj/M	   j	   is	   the	   proportional	   variation	   of	   imports	   listed	   in	   the	   last	   column	   of	  
table	   A,	   and	   tj	   is	   the	  MFN	   tariff	   rate	   listed	   in	   the	   third	   column.	   Thus,	   for	   the	  meat	  
chapter	  we	  compute	  its	  implied	  import	  elasticity	  used	  in	  table	  6	  of	  the	  text	  as:	  	  
e=-­‐92.9/49.3=-­‐1.9.	  
Table	  A:	  MFN	  tariffs	  and	  trade	  reduction	  effects	  of	  a	  HB	  
HS	  
chapter	   Product	   MFN	  tariffs	  
Trade	  impact	  of	  
a	  HB	  
01	   Live	  animals.	   1.0%	   -­‐19.0%	  
02	   Meat	  and	  edible	  meat	  offal	   49.3%	   -­‐92.9%	  
03	   Fish	  and	  crustaceans,	  etc.	   8.4%	   -­‐40.5%	  
04	   Milk,	  dairy	  products,	  honey,	  etc.	   31.3%	   -­‐66.7%	  
05	   Products	  of	  animal	  origin’s.	   0.0%	   -­‐0.0%	  
06	   Live	  trees	  and	  other	  plants	  and	  flowers.	   4.2%	   -­‐23.8%	  
07	   Edible	  vegetables.	   5.6%	   -­‐42.8%	  
08	   Fruits.	   7.5%	   -­‐35.7%	  
09	   Coffee,	  tea,	  mate,	  etc.	   4.1%	   -­‐26.2%	  
10	   Cereals.	   45.7%	   -­‐57.1%	  
11	   Products	  of	  the	  milling	  industry,	  etc.	   26.9%	   -­‐88.1%	  
12	     Oil  seeds  and  oleaginous  fruits.	   2.5%	   -­‐6.6%	  
13	   Lac;;  gums,  resins,  etc.	   1.5%	   -­‐7.2%	  
14	   Vegetable  plaiting  materials,  etc.	   0.0%	   -­‐0.0%	  
15	   Animal  or  vegetable  fats  and  oils.	   6.5%	   -­‐47.6%	  
16	   Preparations  of  meat,  of  fish  or  of  crustaceans,  etc.	   33.3%	   -­‐95.2%	  
17	   Sugars  and  sugar  confectionery.	   42.0%	   -­‐97.6%	  
18	   Cocoa	  and	  cocoa	  preparations.	   11.8%	   -­‐69.0%	  
19	   Preparations  of  cereals,  etc.	   15.1%	   -­‐85.7%	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20	   Preparations  of  vegetables,  fruit,  etc.	   20.9%	   -­‐88.1%	  
21	   Miscellaneous	  edible	  preparations.	   14.4%	   -­‐87.0%	  
22	   Beverages,	  spirits	  and	  vinegar.	   3.9%	   -­‐38.1%	  
23	   Residues	  and	  waste	  from	  the	  food	  industry,	  etc.	   19.0%	   -­‐35.7%	  
24	   Tobacco	  and	  manufactured	  tobacco	  substitutes	   38.1%	   -­‐45.2%	  
Simple	  average	  chapters	  1	  to	  24	   16.4%	   -­‐49.8%	  
Simple	  average	  chapters	  25	  to	  99	   4.0%	   -­‐22,3%	  
	  Source:	  Inferred	  from	  Lawless	  y	  Morgenroth	  (2016)	  as	  follows:	  (i)	  average	  MFN	  tariffs	  from	  Figure	  3	  
and,	  (ii)	  proportional	  trade	  impact	  of	  a	  HB	  from	  Figures	  8	  and	  9.	  	  
Appendix	  B:	  EU	  MFN	  meat	  tariffs	  	  
Usually,	   EU	   MFN	   meat	   barriers	   are	   a	   composite	   of	   ad	   valorem	   and	   specific	  
tariffs39.	  The	  ad	  valorem	  equivalent	   (AVE)	  of	   the	  specific	   tariffs	  have	  been	  estimated	  
following	  the	  guideline	  suggested	  in	  European	  Commission	  (2005)	  according	  to	  which	  
for	  product	  j:	  
AVEj=Sj/(0,25UVej+0,75UVwj)	  (a)	  
where	  S:	  specific	  tariff	  per	  unit;	  UVe:	  unit	  value	  of	  imports	  from	  the	  EU	  and,	  UVw:	  unit	  
value	   of	   imports	   from	   the	   rest	   of	   world40.	   Given	   that	   most	   of	   UK’s	   agro	   industrial	  
imports	  come	  from	  the	  EU	  we	  simplify	  to	  the	  following	  expression:	  
AVEj=Sj/UVej	  	  	  (b)	  
In	  most	  cases,	  for	  each	  product	  there	  is	  a	  range	  of	  specific	  tariffs.	  Consequently	  several	  
AVEs	  have	  been	  estimated	  by:	  
AVEj=[(Smaxj+Sminj)/2]/UVej	  	  	  (c)	  
where	  Smax	  and	  Smin	  are	  the	  maximum	  and	  minimum	  specific	  tariffs.	  
The	  third	  column	  of	  Table	  B	  shows	  ad	  valorem	  tariffs	  and	  the	  next	  four	  columns	  
the	  minimum,	  maximum	  and	  average	  specific	  tariffs	  in	  euros	  and	  dollars.	  Following	  are	  
the	  unit	  values	  estimated	  with	  2016	  trade	  data.	  The	  final	  two	  columns	  show	  AVEs	  and	  
our	  estimates	  of	  the	  EU	  MFN	  tariff	  protection	  (ad	  valorem	  plus	  specific).	  Estimates	  of	  
AVEs	  are	  computed	  at	  the	  six-­‐digit	  level	  for	  the	  main	  trade	  positions	  and	  transformed	  
to	  the	  four	  digit	  level	  either	  by	  simple	  correspondence	  (i.e.	  0201,	  0202,	  0205	  &	  0210),	  
or	  by	  simple	  average	  of	  the	  main	  six	  digit	  positions	  (0203,	  0204	  and	  0207).	  These	  four	  
digit	  estimates	  are	  then	  used	  in	  the	  text	  to	  simulate	  the	  trade	  effects	  of	  a	  HB.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  There	  are	  also	  tariff	  rate	  quotas	  (TRQs)	  but	  these	  are	  part	  of	  the	  Brexit	  negotiations	  and	  we	  have	  not	  
dealt	  with	  them	  here.	  
40	  Due	  to	  high	  preference	  margins	  under	   the	  CAP,	   it	   is	   likely	   that	   intra-­‐EU	  trade	   is	  priced	  above	   levels	  
that	  would	  prevail	  under	  competition.	  Therefore,	  using	  unit	  values	  estimated	  with	  UK	  import	  data	  from	  
the	  EU	  is	  likely	  to	  underestimate	  the	  rates	  of	  MFN	  tariff	  protection.	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Table	  B:	  Meat	  MFN	  tariffs:	  ad	  valorem	  plus	  specific	  









EU	  MFN	  tariff	  

















kg	   2,453	   5,704	   43	   56	  
Average	  





12	   221	  €/100	  kg	  
304	  €/100	  
kg	   263/100	  kg	   2,919	   3,265	   80	   92	  
Average	  
0202	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   3,265	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   92	  
020312	   Pig	  meat	   0	   60	  €/100	  kg	   78	  €/100	  kg	   64/100	  kg	   640	   1,959	   33	   33	  
020319	   Pig	  meat	   0	   47	  €/100	  kg	   87	  €/100	  kg	   67/100	  kg	   744	   2,596	   29	   29	  
020329	   Pig	  meat	   0	   47	  €/100	  kg	   87	  €/100	  kg	   67/100	  kg	   744	   2,365	   31	   31	  
Average	  
0203	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   2,307	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   31	  






€/100kg	   2,609	   4,322	   60	   73	  






€/100kg	   1,721	   6,265	   27	   40	  




€/100kg	   1,432	   5,997	   24	   37	  
Average	  
0204	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   5,528	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   50	  
0205	   Horsemeat	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   nc	   0	   0	  
Average	  
0205	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   0	  
0206	   Meat	  residues	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   1,777	   	   47	  
020713	   Chicken	  meat	   6	   101€/100kg	   102€/100kg	   102/100kg	   1,132	   3,204	   35	   41	  
020714	   Chicken	  meat	   6	   101€/100kg	   102€/100kg	   102€/100kg	   1,132	   3,339	   34	   40	  
Average	  





	   	   	   	   	   4,863	   	   47	  






15	   60€/100kg	   151€/100kg	   106€/100kg	   1,177	   3,102	   40	   55	  
Average	  
0210	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   55	  
Notes:	   (1)	   decimals	   have	   been	   rounded;	   (2)	   when	   there	   are	  more	   than	   one	   ad	   valorem	   rates	  we	   use	   the	   simple	   average;	   (3)	  
estimates	  of	  unit	  values	  are	  from	  2016	  trade	  statistics	  of	  UK	  imports	  from	  the	  EU;	  (4)	  specific	  tariffs	  are	  transformed	  from	  euros	  to	  
dollars	   using	   the	   average	   2016	   exchange	   rate:	   USD	   1.11	   per	   euro	   and,	   (5)	   for	   the	   following	   three	   sectors	   we	   have	   used	   the	  
weighted	  average	  (by	  UK	  imports)	  of	  the	  MFN	  tariff	  (47%)	  	  from	  the	  other	  sectors:	  0206,	  	  0208	  and,	  0209;	  (6)	  because	  trademap	  
has	  recorded	  values	  but	  not	  quantities	  of	  UK	  imports	  from	  the	  EU,	  we	  have	  estimated	  unite	  values	  from	  UK	  imports	  from	  world.	  
Source:	  Trade	  data	  from	  trademap	  and	  tariff	  data	  from	  WTO	  integrated	  tariff	  data:	  
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/schedules_e/goods_schedules_table_e.htm.	  
